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A Guide to Export Controls
for the Non-Specialist
JOHN

R. LIEBMAN* & KEVIN J. LOMBARDO**

I. INTRODUCTION

The export of products, technology, and services from the
United States comprises an essential element of the ability of U.S.
companies to conduct business globally. Yet, many nations, and in
particular the U.S., place rigorous controls on the export of certain
products, technology, and services to customers in other countries,
reflecting their national security and foreign policy concerns.' In
order to maintain the ability to export its products, a U.S. business
enterprise must comply with the applicable U.S. export control
laws (some of which apply extraterritorially).
Under U.S. law, there are serious administrative, civil, and
criminal consequences for violations of the export control laws.
U.S. export controls (discussed below) apply equally to U.S.
companies and, in many cases, to their foreign affiliates as well.
Sanctions that may be imposed against a U.S. company for export
violations include the denial of export privileges and substantial
civil fines.2 Criminal sanctions may include heavy fines levied
against a company, its subsidiaries and culpable individual

* Mr. Liebman is of counsel at McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP, Los Angeles, California,
and was an adjunct professor of law, Loyola Law School of Los Angeles, 2003-2004.
** Mr. Lombardo, also of McKenna Long & Aldridge, graduated from Loyola Law School
in 2001 and is an associate in McKenna's government contracts department.
1. See, e.g., Christopher F. Corr, The Wall Still Stands! Complying with Export
Controls on Technology Transfers in the Post-Cold War, Post-9/11 Era, 25 HOUS. J. INT'L
L. 441, 443-46 (2003); Gregory W. Bowman, E-mails, Servers, and Software: U.S. Export
Controls for the Modern Era, 35 GEO. J. INT' L. 325-26 (2004); Daniel H. Joyner, The
EnhancedProliferationControl Initiative: National Security Necessity or Unconstitutionally
Vague?, 32 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 107, 112-15 (2004).
2. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(a)(1)-(2) (2006).
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employees, and the imprisonment of culpable employees.3 In
addition, many of the countries in which U.S. companies and their
foreign affiliates conduct business impose significant restrictions
on the import and export of goods, technology, and services. In
view of the consequences of export violations, employers'
responses to employee misconduct in this area should include
immediate suspension and separation from employment. U.S.
export controls also apply to a company's consultants, sales
representatives, and distributors when selling, distributing,
manufacturing or servicing the company's products, or receiving
technical data, software, or services.
In today's contentious and sometimes xenophobic climate,
companies that engage in transactions or activities contrary to U.S.
export regulations, or the regulations of any other nation, do so at
considerable risk.4 Accordingly, U.S. companies must take
aggressive measures to ensure that their activities, and those of
their employees,
consultants,
sales representatives,
and
distributors comport with the standards set forth by: (1) the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations ("ITAR")' administered
by the State Department, (2) the Export Administration
Regulations
("EAR") 6 administered
by
the Commerce
Department, (3)
the various trade embargo
programs
administered by the Treasury Department, and (4) any other
applicable national laws and regulations, such as Special Export
Controls. These four areas are discussed more fully below.

3. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1705(b) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b), (b)(3), (c)(3), (d) (2006).
4. Donald W. Smith, Defense of Export Control Enforcement Actions, reprinted in
COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 2003; EXPORT CONTROLS & SANCTIONS: WHAT
LAWYERS NEED TO KNOW 615-16 (Practising Law Institute 2003) ("In dealing with issues

involving the U.S. export control laws, many companies consistently fail to recognize the
severe potential consequences which can result from violations, or alleged violations, of
these laws.").
5. International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. pts. 120-130 (2006).
6. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. pts. 730-774 (2006).
7. See generally R. Richard Newcomb, Director of the Office of Foreign Assets
Control, Office of Foreign Assets Controlb An Overview, reprinted in COPING WITH U.S.
EXPORT CONTROLS 2003; EXPORT CONTROLS & SANCTIONS: WHAT LAWYERS NEED TO

KNOW, supra note 4, at 653-77 (providing an overview of Treasury Department
embargos).
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II. OVERVIEW OF EXPORT CONTROL LAWS
A. Introduction
Generally, the U.S. Government controls exports on a caseby-case basis, examining such factors as destination, end-user, the
product, and its end-use. Accordingly, a company, along with its
U.S. and foreign affiliates, divisions, and subsidiaries, must comply
with all government regulations concerning: (a) exports, imports,
re-exports or re-transfers of products and technical data, (b) the
rendition of services to foreign persons, and (c) regulations
concerning participation in financial transactions with certain
designated countries and nationals of those countries. A company
should not make any exports without verifying compliance with all
applicable laws and regulations (which, in certain cases, will
require a license from the agency administering those regulations).
Because exports are controlled by different agencies depending on
the inherent nature of the product (defense article or "dual use"
article), proper regulatory classification is essential
The laws define an "export" broadly. In addition to the
conventional shipment of products abroad from the U.S., an
export includes:
The removal from the U.S. of any commodity or technical
information, whether for sale, demonstration, exchange or
discussion. This includes personal baggage, laptop computers,
product samples and software;
The disclosure in any manner (including oral and visual) of
any technical data, including software or other information, to any
"foreign person," irrespective of whether that disclosure is made in
the U.S. or elsewhere. A "foreign person" is an individual who is
neither a U.S. citizen, permanent U.S. resident nor immigrant
alien who has the right to reside and be employed in the U.S.; and
8. Reexport or retransfer means the transfer of products or services "to an end-use,
end-user or destination not previously authorized." 22 C.F.R. § 120.19 (2006). Typically,
this occurs when a company properly exports an item to a foreign country, then
"reexports" the item to another country without proper authorization.
9. See John R. Liebman, Product Classification and Regulatory Compliance,
reprinted in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 2003; EXPORT CONTROLS &
SANCTIONS: WHAT LAWYERS NEED TO KNOW, supra note 4, at 583,593-94.

10. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(4) (2006). No "foreign person" should be employed or offered
employment by a company without prior approval of the Export Compliance Officer, and,
in any case, is subject to the company in question obtaining an appropriate export license
for that purpose.
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The rendition of a service to or for the benefit of a non-U.S.
person, irrespective of whether such service is rendered in the U.S.
or elsewhere."
Accordingly, companies should educate employees as to the
"who," "what," "when," "where," and "how" of export, reexport
and import policies and procedures for products, technical data,
software, and services. In order to prevent violations of export
laws and subsequent enforcement proceedings, a company must
require that its domestic and foreign affiliates:
Demonstrate a commitment to create active management
dedicated to creating and maintaining an effective export control
program;
Select an appropriate Export Compliance Officer ("ECO");
Assure that the ECO has adequate staff, resources, training
and supervision;
Establish a compliance program; and
Instill a culture of compliance in all company personnel.'2
B. Three Main Types of Export Controls
There are three main federal agencies that control exports:
(1) the U.S. Department of State ("State"), (2) the U.S.
Department of Commerce ("Commerce"), and (3) the U.S.
Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control
("OFAC")."3 Certain commodities are subject to control by State,
others by Commerce, while OFAC controls certain transactions,
irrespective of the nature of the commodity." The majority of
exports which require a license are controlled on the Commerce
11. See, e.g., Id. § 120.17(5); 15 C.F.R. pt. 734 (2006). Transfers of controlled
technical data frequently occur in academic, commercial, and industrial environments.
12. See generally Smith, supra note 4, at 615-16 ("The best strategy for avoiding
entanglement in an export control enforcement action is an effective internal control
system ...[along with] continuing support of top management for the program and their
willingness to devote sufficient personnel resources to its implementation."); John R.
Liebman, Export Compliance Counseling: The Role of Corporate Culture, reprinted in
COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 2003; EXPORT CONTROLS & SANCTIONS: WHAT
LAWYERS NEED TO KNOW, supra note 4, at 597-607 (explaining the need for a corporate
culture that supports regulatory compliance and providing models of compensation
programs).
13. See Cecil Hunt, Department of Commerce Export Controls, reprintedin COPING
WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 2003; EXPORT CONTROLS & SANCTIONS: WHAT
LAWYERS NEED TO KNOW, supra note 4, at 44-46; see also U.S. Department of the

Treasury,
Office
of
Foreign
http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/.
14. See Hunt, supra note 13, at 46.

Assets

Control,
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Control List ("CCL")"' administered by Commerce or the U.S.
Munitions List ("USML")' 6 administered by State. Commerce
primarily uses its CCL to regulate the export of "dual-use" items,
meaning items that are suitable for either military or nonmilitary
related use." State, however, controls the export of defense
articles, services, and related technologies. Conversely, OFAC is
responsible for setting economic and trade sanctions against,
among other things, certain foreign countries and terrorismsponsoring organizations.
The following is a brief overview of the export control laws of
State, Commerce, and Treasury. This overview is not intended to
detail the complexity of the export control laws, but rather is
designed to give the non-specialist a helpful introduction.
1. State Controls-ITAR
State controls the export of defense articles and services
under the ITAR.8 The ITAR, promulgated pursuant to section 38
of the Arms Export Control Act, 9 and administered by the
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls ("DDTC")2 ° at State,
regulates the manufacture, temporary import and export of
"defense articles," and the export of "defense services" and
"technical data" appurtenant to defense articles and defense
services (these terms are defined and discussed more fully below)."
Rigorous compliance with the ITAR is essential to the integrity
and success of a company's business operations.
The USML is part of the ITAR and sets forth what State has
designated to be defense articles and defense services.' The
USML is divided into twenty-one categories and has been drafted

15. Commerce Control List, 15 C.F.R. pt. 774, supp. 1 (2006). The CCL is part of the
EAR. 15 C.F.R. pts. 730-774.
16. The United States Munitions List, 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2006). The USML is part of
the ITAR. 22 C.F.R. pts. 120-130 (2006).
17. See 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2006).

18. 22 C.F.R. pts. 120-30 (2006).
19. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2778, 2794(7) (2006).
20. The DDTC, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, in accordance with 22 U.S.C. §§
2778-2780 of the Arms Export Controls Act ("AECA") and the ITAR, is charged with
controlling the export and temporary import of defense articles and defense services
covered by the United States Munitions List.
21.

ERIC L. HIRSCHHORN, THE EXPORT CONTROL AND EMBARGO HANDBOOK 111

(2d ed. 2005).
22. See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2006).
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to include categories such as "Guns and Armament ' ' 23 and
"Directed Energy Weapons," 24 and cover such articles as guns,
explosives, ships, aircraft, lasers, and space electronics. As a matter
of policy, items on the USML are limited to those specifically
designed for military application.' Conversely, the "dual use"
items listed on the CCL have a predominantly civil application are
controlled by Commerce.
According to the ITAR, defense articles, defense services,
and technical data are defined as follows:
(a) Defense Articles
Defense articles consist of two types of products. The first
group includes eighteen categories of products deemed to be on
the U.S. Munitions List set forth in Part 121. The second group
includes a "catch-all" category for articles that are not specifically
enumerated in other categories of the Munitions List, but which
have substantial military application and have been specifically
designed or modified for military purposes.26 The "catch-all"

category also includes technical data and defense services that are
"directly related to the defense articles enumerated in [the
previous definition of defense articles]."' Some defense articles
appear on the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex
("MTCR")' and may be controlled by Commerce as well as by
State. ITAR also may apply a broader designation authority.29 This
enables State to bring within ITAR jurisdiction any article or
service if it:
(a) Is specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted,
or modified for a military application, and
(i) Does not have predominant civil applications, and
(ii) Does not have performance equivalent (defined by form,
fit and function) to those of an article or service used for civil
applications,
- or -

(b) Is specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted,
or modified for a military application, and has significant military

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. § 121.1 (Category 1I).
Id. § 121.1 (Category XVIII).
Id. § 121.1 at Category 11 (3); Category 111(5).
Id. § 121.1 at Category XXI ("Miscellaneous Articles") (a).
Id. § 121.1 at Category XXI ("Miscellaneous Articles") (b).
Id. § 121.16.
Id. § 120.2.
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or intelligence applicability such that control under this subchapter
is necessary."
Furthermore, the intended use of the article or service after
its export (i.e., for a military or civilian purpose) is not relevant in
determining whether the article or service is subject to ITAR
controls; the product's capability is the controlling concern.31
(b) Defense Services
Defense services encompass "[tlhe. furnishing of assistance
(including training) to foreign persons, whether in the U.S. or
abroad, in the design, development, engineering, manufacture,
production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, modification,
operation, demilitarization, destruction, processing or use of
defense articles . ,
" Furthermore, defense services also include:
(1) "[t]he furnishing to foreign persons any technical data
controlled [by the ITAR], whether in the United States or
abroad"; " or (2) "[m]ilitary training of foreign units and forces ...
including formal or informal instruction of foreign persons in the
United States or abroad or by correspondence courses, technical,
educational, or information publications and media of all kinds,
training aid, orientation, training exercise, and military advice." 4
Under 22 C.F.R. Section 124.1, licensing requirements applicable
to defense services apply irrespective of whether the information
or technical data to be disclosed is in the public domain or is
otherwise exempt from licensing requirements under Section
125.4."
(c) Technical Data
Technical data includes information related to defense
articles. This includes information required for the design,
development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly,
testing,
repair,
maintenance,
modification,
operation,
demilitarization, destruction, processing or use of defense articles. 6
Further, technical data "includes information in the form of
blueprints, drawings, photographs, plans, instructions [and]

30. Id. § 120.3.
31. Id. Articles or services that do not meet this test, but that have the capability for
dual use are controlled by Commerce under the EAR.
32. 22 C.F.R. § 120.9(a)(1) (2006).
33. Id. § 120.9(a)(2).
34. Id. § 120.9(a)(3).
35. Id. § 124.1(a).
36. See id. § 120.10(a)(1).
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documentation."37 Under the ITAR, technical data may also
include certain classified information as well as information
covered by an invention secrecy order and software directly
related to defense articles. 8 However, the ITAR does not control
"general scientific, mathematical, or engineering principles
commonly taught in schools."3 9 Thus, in addition to the relatively
descriptive categories in Part 121, the ITAR enables the exporter
to engage in a self-classification process by inviting an overlay of
its products and services against the parameters set out in the
ITAR.
Broadly speaking, no defense article, defense service, or
technical data (as defined by the ITAR) may be exported or
reexported without the prior approval (i.e., a license) from State. '
Moreover, not only is a license required from State before a
munitions item may be exported, but a firm must register with
State's DDTC before engaging in any munitions manufacturing or
exporting activities. Anyone who engages in the manufacturing,
brokering, importing, or exporting of defense articles or furnishing
defense services must register with State.4' Licenses are also
required to provide defense services or enter into technical
assistance or manufacturing license agreements, even if no article
or technical data is exported. 2 Since obtaining a license from State
requires considerable resources and substantial time and effort,
the company must allow adequate lead time between the date the
company accepts an order for goods and the date upon which the
company is to deliver the goods.
The ITAR also provides for various exclusions and
exemptions, but these limited exemptions and exclusions from
licensing requirements must be well understood in order to be
fully and properly utilized. The exclusions from ITAR controls
apply to all destinations, whereas exemptions from these controls
37. Id.
38. 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(2)-(4) (2006).
39. Id. § 120.10(a)(5) (2006).
40. See Philip S. Rhoads, The InternationalTraffic in Arms Regulations: Compliance
and Enforcement in the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls U.S. Department of State,
reprinted in COPING WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 2003; EXPORT CONTROLS &
SANCTIONS: WHAT LAWYERS NEED TO KNOW, supra note 4, at 495-96.

41. 22 C.F.R. § 122.1(a); 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(1)(A) (2006); 22 C.F.R. pt. 129 (2006)
(imposing registration requirement upon brokers of defense articles). For in-depth
information regarding registration procedures, see Rhoads, supra note 40, at 496-501, and
HIRSCHHORN, supra note 21, at 121-27.
42. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. §§ 123.15, 123.16 (2006).
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generally apply only selectively to favored destinations. Generally,
however, what is excluded or exempted from State licensing
requirements is subject to Commerce jurisdiction. 3 Most ITAR
excluded or exempted items are less rigorously controlled by
Commerce. Exclusions from ITAR licensing requirements
applicable to all destinations are listed in various parts of the
ITAR," and include, inter alia: (1) specified aircraft types and
components; 5 (2) forgings, castings, and machined bodies in
normal commercial use; "6 (3) cartridge and shell casings rendered
useless;47 (4) mere travel outside the U.S. by a person whose
personal knowledge includes technical data;"8 and (5) general
scientific, mathematical or engineering principles commonly
taught in schools, colleges, and universities, information in the
public domain, or basic marketing information on function or
purpose or general system descriptions. 9
The ITAR implicitly relies on the business community to
apply rigorous self-classification procedures to determine whether
a given commodity or technology is subject to ITAR export
controls. The ITAR, however, also sets forth a procedure that the
exporter may invoke to obtain a "commodity jurisdiction" ("CJ")
determination from State in cases of doubt.' A CJ procedure is
used to determine whether an item or service is subject to export
licensing authority of either State or Commerce."
For more information
regarding the ITAR, visit
www.pmdtc.org.
2. Commerce Controls-EAR
Commerce regulates exports using the EAR, including the
Anti-boycott Regulations ("ABR")."2 Commerce controls, which
43. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.3 (2006).
44. These include 22 C.F.R. §§ 121.1 Category VIII(a), (b), (f), and (h); 121.1
Categories XI(c) and XII(e); 121.10; 121.1 Category III(f)(2); 120.17(1); 121.1 Category
X(a); 121.1 Category IV(a); 121.11; 121.1 Category V(d); 121.1 Category XIII(d); 121.1
Category XII(c); and 120.10(5).
45. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 Category VIII(a), (b), (f), and (h).
46. Id. § 121.10.
47. Id. § 121.1 Category III(f)(2); 15 C.F.R. § 770.2(g).
48. Id. § 120.17(1).

49. Id. § 120.10(5).
50. Id. § 120.4.
51.

Id.; see also HIRSCHHORN, supra note 21, at 113.

52. 15 C.F.R. pt. 760 (2006). Strictly speaking, the ABR are not export controls. The
Commerce and Treasury Departments' regulations and guidelines impose penalties upon
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were originally authorized by the Export Administration Act
("EAA"),53 and presently are authorized by the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA")," regulate exports
in several areas of governmental concern, including anti-terrorism,

crime

control,

encryption

items,

foreign

policy,

missile

proliferation, and national security."
The EAR is designed to identify those items that are "subject
to the EAR," meaning items and activities regulated by
Commerce. 6 The EAR includes controls imposed for a variety of

purposes, and covers exports, reexports and retransfers
commercial

("dual-use")

of

commodities, services and technical

data. 7 Items (e.g., commodities, technology and software) subject
to the EAR include all items "in the United States" and items of
"U.S. origin" outside of the U.S., with the exception of: (a) items
controlled by another agency, (b) publicly available technology

and software, and (c) foreign-origin items with U.S.-origin content
that is below a specified percentage. 8 Activities subject to the
EAR include, inter alia: (i) exportation from the U.S. (and any
reexportation), and (ii) certain releases of technology or software

to a foreign national. 9
Once a company decides that an item or service is subject to
the EAR, the company must then decide whether the export
requires a license. The EAR provides that an entity may
undertake transactions subject to the EAR without a license

any U.S. person who participates in, or cooperates or complies with, a boycott not
sanctioned by the U.S. (including, for example, the Arab League Boycott of Israel). Id. pt.
760.2. These rules apply to all "U.S. persons," including individuals and companies located
in the U.S. and their foreign affiliates, subsidiaries, and divisions. Id. pt. 760.1(b).
53. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2420 (2000) (expired Aug. 20, 2001).
54. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2000).
55. See HIRSCHHORN, supra note 21, at 7.
56. 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(a) (2006).
57. See HIRSCHHORN, supra note 21, at 6.
58. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.4.
59. The "release" of software or source code to a foreign national who is not a
permanent resident is considered to be a "deemed export" to that person's home country.
See id. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii). According to Commerce, technology is considered "released" for
export when: (a) it is available to foreign nationals for visual inspection (such as reading
technical specifications, plans, blueprints, etc.); (b) technology is exchanged orally with
foreign nationals; or (c) technology is made available to foreign nationals by practice or
application under the guidance of persons with knowledge of the technology. Id. §
734.2(b)(3). Deemed exports are subject to the license requirements that would apply to
an actual transfer of technology or software to the country in question. See id. §
734.2(b)(2)(ii).
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"unless the regulations affirmatively state such a requirement. '
Generally, under the EAR, most commercial commodities,
technical data, software, and services on the market today
(including products not subject to the ITAR) may be exported to
almost any nation in the world with few, if any, conditions
attached.
The EAR provides ten "General Prohibitions" that describe
the scenarios under which Commerce requires an export license.6'
General Prohibitions one through three are product or so-called
"list based" controls, pursuant to which the CCL and the Country
Chart (described more fully below) are used to determine the
license requirements.62 General Prohibitions four through ten-the
so-called "catch-all" controls-describe certain activities that are
not permitted without prior authorization from Commerce.63
Commerce, through the EAR, maintains the CCL (discussed
in General Prohibitions one through three). The CCL details the
items subject to Commerce's licensing requirements, but does not
include those items exclusively controlled for export by another
agency.' Nevertheless, a company should be familiar with the CCL
and its classification process for all items that the company
exports.
The CCL is divided into ten categories, numbered zero
through nine, ranging from nuclear materials to propulsion
systems.6 Within each category, the items are arranged into five
60. See id. § 736.1.
61. See HIRSCHHORN, supra note 21, at 13-15.
62. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 736.2(b)(1) (Export and reexport of controlled items to listed
countries), 736.2(b)(2) (Reexport and export from abroad of foreign-made items
incorporating more than a de minimus amount of controlled U.S. content), 736.2(b)(3)
(Reexport and export from abroad of the foreign-produced direct product of U.S.
technology and software).
63. See id. §§ 736.2(b)(4) (Engaging in actions prohibited by a denial order),
736.2(b)(5) (Export or reexport to prohibited end-uses or end-users), 736.2(b)(6) (Export
or reexport to embargoed destinations); 736.2(b)(7) (Support of proliferation activities),
736.2(b)(8) (In transit shipments and items to be unladen from vessels or aircraft),
736.2(b)(9) (Violation of any order, terms, and conditions), and 736.2(b)(10) (Proceeding
with transactions with knowledge that a violation has occurred or is about to occur).
64. Items that are "subject to the EAR" but are not on the CCL require a license only
in certain situations. These items are called "EAR 99" items. HIRSCHHORN, supra note
21, at 26.
65. The categories are as follows:
0 - Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Equipment and Miscellaneous
1 - Materials, Chemicals, "Microorganisms," and Toxins
2 - Materials Processing

3 - Electronics
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subcategories, or groups, which are: (A) Equipment, Assemblies
and Components; (B) Test, Inspection and Production Equipment;
(C) Materials; (D) Software; and (E) Technology.66 Within each of
these subcategories, the items are organized by their Export
Control Classification Number ("ECCN"). The ECCN is a five
digit number that identifies the item by category, group, and
reason for control.67 For example, ECCN 7D101, refers to software
that is specifically designed or modified for the development or
production of certain types of navigation equipment. The "7"
places the item under category 7, Navigation and Avionics. The
"D" puts the item in subgroup D, Software. The "101" identifies
the type of controls, or "Reasons for Controls,"' which, in this
case, would be Missile Technology.69
Through this intricate classification process in the EAR's
CCL and Commerce Country Chart," a control matrix emerges
that determines whether a given commodity and its related
production equipment, technical information, and software must
be licensed by Commerce before it may be lawfully exported from
the U.S. (or reexported by the foreign customer who previously
4 - Computers
5 - Telecommunications and Information Security
6 - Lasers and Sensors

7 - Navigation and Avionics
8 - Marine
9 - Propulsion Systems, Space Vehicles and Related Equipment.
15 C.F.R. § 738.2(a).
66. See id. § 738.2(b).
67.

HIRSCHHORN, supra note 21, at 27.

68. The Reasons for Control are as follows:
0-99 - National Security

100-199 - Missile Technology
200-299 - Nuclear

300-399 - Chemical and Biological Weapons
900-999 - Anti-terrorism, Crime Control, Regional Stability, UN Sanctions, etc.
15 C.F.R. § 738.2(d).
69. The license requirements section of each ECCN identifies all the possible reasons
for control, which are: Anti-Terrorism (AT), Chemical & Biological Weapons (CB),
Crime Control (CC), Chemical Weapons Convention (CW), Encryption Items (El),
Firearms Convention (FC), Missile Technology (MT), National Security (NS), Nuclear
Nonproliferation (NP), Regional Stability (RS), Short Supply (SS), Computers (XP), and
Significant Items (SI). Id. § 738.2(d)(2)(i)(A).
70. 15 C.F.R. pt. 738 supp. 1. The "Country Chart" header identifies a column name
and number that applies to each Reason for Control. Therefore, by identifying the country
to which the item will be exported, and the Reason for Control (if any) to that particular
country for the items at issue, one can determine whether a license is required to export a
particular item.
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acquired the commodity). The matrix reveals that the level of
control applied is determined by four factors: (i) the level of
technological sophistication of the commodity, (ii)
the
commodity's potential for becoming the foundation of more
advanced technology, (iii) the commodity's end-use, and (iv) the
end-user to whom the exporter desires to send the commodity. For
example, applying foreign policy criteria, the level of control
applied to a given product is likely to be very low if it is to be
exported to Canada, whereas Cuba is virtually embargoed by the
U.S. Similarly, applying national security criteria, North Atlantic
Trade Organization ("NATO") members fare better than some
non-NATO countries. It is essential that a company establish and
maintain a Product-Country Matrix for all products, services, and
related items that are or may be exported.
In addition to knowing how the EAR applies to its products
and services, a company must know its customers. Knowing the
customers is essential because Commerce has the power to
suspend individuals and companies, both in the U.S. and abroad,
from eligibility to export from the U.S. or to be recipients of U.S.
exports. Such suspensions or debarments are found in Commerce's
Denied Persons List ("DPL"), which is frequently updated and
available for inspection at www.bis.doc.gov. 7' Business transactions
may not take place with the parties identified on any of these lists.72
Accordingly, it is mandatory that a company establish-and
consistently apply- procedures that require that all customers of
products or services intended for export be checked against these
lists before orders are accepted or shipped.
Export controls are not confined to U.S. companies. Since
export controls apply not only to products, but also to the
technologies those products embody, the export controls follow
the products until the product is transformed into larger orders of
products, so that the relevance of the original product (and the
technology it contains) is minimal. For example, an electronic
product exported from the U.S. under a Commerce license may
not be re-exported to a third country without securing additional

71. HIRSCHHORN, supra note 21, at 31, 31 n.218. Similar lists are published by State,
www.pmdtc.org, and OFAC, www.ustreas.gov/ofac.
72. See HIRSCHHORN, supra note 21, at 31 ("The EAR ... hold exporters strictly

liable (i.e., without any showing that the exporter acted deliberately or even negligently)
for export-related dealings with denied parties.")
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government approval." This policy has created considerable
resentment among trading partners of the U.S. and is often
questioned by legal scholars;74 yet, it remains the law. For that
reason, foreign affiliates are as responsible for compliance with the
EAR as their U.S. counterparts. Moreover, the foreign affiliates
must also be informed about, and comply with, local law.
For more information, visit the Bureau of Industry and
Security ("BIS") website at www.bis.doc.gov, or call the BIS
Export Counseling Division at 202.482.4811.
3. Treasury Department-OFAC
The U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets
Control regulates a company's participation in financial
transactions with certain countries (and nationals thereof)
designated by Treasury. 5 For example, OFAC requires the
company to obtain a license prior to proceeding with a financial
transaction with a "target country" designated by Treasury.76
Unfortunately, there is no list, or set of regulations issued by
OFAC comparable to the USML or the CCL. Rather, the Code of
Federal Regulations contains various provisions detailing
sanctions against specific target countries or entities. Each part is
designed specifically to regulate transactions with that country'
and in at least one instance expressly states that "[d]iffering
foreign policy and national security circumstances may result in
differing interpretations of similar language among the parts of
this chapter.""
Under the Code of Federal Regulations, no transaction of any
kind is permitted between a company (or any of its employees or
73. This rule, however, is subject to de minimis considerations. 15 C.F.R. § 734.4
(2006). The ITAR, however, contains no such exceptions, subjecting any product
containing a USML item to ITAR controls, and has led to absurd results in some
instances.
74. Comment, ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Law: The Case of Export
Controls,132 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 367-75 (1984); Trevor Hiestand, Swords into Plowshares:
Considerationsfor 21st Century Export Controls in the United States, 9 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 679, 707 (1995).
75. OFAC also regulates dealing in financial assets of sanctioned countries located in
the U.S. See generally HIRSCHHORN, supra note 21, at 179-82 (summarizing the statutory
basis of OFAC controls).
76. Id. at 179.
77. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. pts. 535 (Cuba), 560 (Iran) (2006).
78. See, e.g., id. §§ 535.101 (Cuba), 560.101 (Iran).
79. Id. § 545.101 (Taliban sanctions).
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affiliates) and any entity located within a country identified as
supporting international terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Libya, North
Korea, Sudan, Syria, or Myanmar (Burma).80 Transactions between
a company and entities identified as engaging in proliferation
activities are subject to special limitations imposed by both State
and Commerce." Any solicitation to conduct a transaction with
any of these countries (or their nationals) or any entities identified
as proliferation risks must be handled with extreme caution.82
Moreover, U.S. policy may vary in its application to countries from
time to time, necessitating regular visits to consult the regulations
in force at any given time.
For
more
information
regarding
OFAC,
visit
www.treas.gov/ofac, or call 202.622.2490 (compliance) or
202.622.2480 (licensing).
C. Special Export Controls - ECPIand The Wassenaar
Arrangement
Several criteria are applied by the U.S. Government in
determining the circumstances under which the export of goods or
services will be permitted. Goods and services that, under normal
circumstances, could be exported from the U.S. without advance
licensing may fall under one of these "special export controls" and
may not be exported without express advance approval. Special
export controls cover exports in two main areas: (1) exports
covered by the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative
("EPCI"),83 which includes the export of goods or the rendition of
services to end-users or to countries who are known to present
risks in terms of the proliferation of chemical and biological
weapons, missiles, and nuclear weaponry; and (2) exports of goods
that are subject to multilateral scrutiny under the terms of the
Wassenaar Arrangement. '
The EPCI was initiated by Commerce in 1991.5 The initiative
imposes special licensing requirements for exports to end-users or
countries that have been implicated in the proliferation of
80. 15 C.F.R. pt. 746 (2006).
81. Id. pt. 744 supp. 4; 22 C.F.R. § 126.1 (2006).
82. See discussion infra Section II.C.
83. 15 C.F.R. §§ 744.1-744.6 (2006).

84. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and
Dual-Use

Goods

and

Technologies

http://www.wassenaar.org/docs/IE96.html.
85.

HIRSCHHORN, supra note 21, at 460.

(1996),

available

at
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chemical and biological, missile, or nuclear weapons
development.6 Although Commerce regulations identify such endusers and countries (discussed above), exporters may be charged
with knowledge of the presence of such factors in respect of endusers or projects that do not appear on the various government
lists.' Exports to all such end-users or countries require special
licensing procedures.' Any employee becoming aware of
circumstances that suggest the presence of EPCI concerns must
report them to the ECO.
Similarly, the Wassenaar Arrangement also imposes certain
special export controls. The history of the Wassenaar
Arrangement dates back several decades. The post-World War II
period was characterized by tension between the U.S. and the
Soviet Union, leading to the organization of military blocs, which
included NATO in the West. One outgrowth of NATO was the
formation of a group known as the Coordinating Committee on
Multilateral Export Controls ("COCOM").' The purpose of the
COCOM was to establish export controls for its members on
certain "dual use" commodities and technology that the NATO
members considered strategic." Items appearing on the COCOM
list could not be exported to non-NATO countries without the
approval of the government of the country of origin and COCOM.
As a "relic" of the Cold War, COCOM was disbanded on
March 21, 1994."' However, on July 13, 1996, the U.S. and the
former COCOM countries approved the establishment of a new
cooperative regime to prevent exports of conventional arms and
dual-use goods and technologies to so-called "pariah" nations: the
"Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional
Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.

92

The Wassenaar

86. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. §§ 744.2, 744.4, 744.5,744.6 (2006).
87. Daniel H. Joyner, The Enhanced ProliferationControl Initiative:National Security
Necessity or Unconstitutionally Vague?, 32 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 107, 109-11 (2004)

("The obvious purpose of the EPCI provisions is to supplement the inherently limited
quality of an enumerated list-based system of regulation with a more inclusive or 'catchall' normative framework.").
88. See 15 C.F.R. § 744.1 (2006). Some of these countries may appear in supplements
to Part 744 of the EAR.
89. See Jamil Jaffer, Strengthening the Wassenaar Export Control Regime, 3 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 519, 519 (2002).
90. See id.

91. Id.; see also Hunt, supra note 13, at 43.
92. Hunt, supra note 13, at 43; Jaffer, supra note 89, at 520. Currently, there are 40
member countries of the Wassenaar Arrangement: Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland,
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Arrangement control lists can be found on their website at
www.wassenaar.org.
Finally, H.R. 3100, the East Asia Security Act, was introduced
in Congress in Summer, 2005. If enacted in its original version, this
bill would have applied broad and stringent controls to all exports
from the U.S. to China and, potentially, other countries as well.
Although the original bill was defeated,93 its introduction in the
Congress symbolizes the concern in Washington with the rise of
China as an economic and military superpower" and foreshadows
a much more restrictive environment for the conduct of trade in
the United States. 9 In fact, Commerce recently published
proposed revisions to the EAR the effect of which would be to
require licenses for exports of certain CCL items to China,
previously not requiring licenses, where the end-use is deemed to
be military.96

III.

PENALTIES: THE CONSEQUENCES OF ILLEGAL IMPORTS

Failure to comply with the U.S. export regulations, as noted
above, may result in fines, as well as suspension or revocation of a
company's export privileges.' Individuals who participate in an
export activity that is not properly authorized or licensed will be
held accountable for the illegal activity. Violations are punishable
by fines or imprisonment, or both,98 and the potential loss of
employment with the company in question.
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea,
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom and United States. The Wassenar
Arrangement: Introduction, http://www.wassenaar.org/introduction/index.html.
93. The original version of the East Asia Security Act was defeated on the House
floor July 14, 2005. William Matthews, U.S. House OKs Version of Dual-Use Export Bill;
Trade Groups Have Reservations, DEFENSE NEWS, July 25, 2005, at 58. However, a
"toned-down version of legislation" was later passed. Id.
94. William Matthews, U.S. Lawmakers Defeat Anti-China-Trade Bill, DEFENSE
NEWS, July 18, 2005, at 17 (noting the bill was a product of "rising anti-China sentiments"
in the House of Representatives).
95. John M. Doyle et al., China Syndrome; Worried about China's Military Buildup,
U.S. Could Impose Tighter Control on Tech Transfers, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
Feb. 20, 2006, at 83 (reporting that, in the wake of China's military buildup, the Commerce
Department is working on changes to export rules regarding giving sensitive technology to
foreign nationals within the U.S., and the Defense Department hopes to reform aspects of
the ITAR).
96. See 71 C.F.R. § 38313 (2006).
97. See HIRSCHHORN, supra note 21, at 101.
98. See generally id. at 101-05.
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For example, according to the ITAR Section 127.1, the
following actions are deemed violations:
To export or attempt to export from the United States any
defense article or technical data or to furnish any defense service
for which a license or written approval is required by this
subchapter without first obtaining the required license or written
approval from the Office of Defense Trade Controls;
To import or attempt to import any defense article whenever
a license is required by this subchapter without first obtaining the
required license or written approval from the Office of Defense
Trade Controls;
To conspire to export, import, reexport or cause to be
exported, imported or reexported, any defense article or to furnish
any defense service for which a license or written approval is
required by this subchapter without first obtaining the required
license or written approval from the Office of Defense Trade
Controls; or
To violate any of the terms or conditions of licenses or
approvals granted pursuant to this subchapter.'
A person who violates the licensing requirements of the
ITAR is liable for civil and criminal penalties, which includes
suspension, debarment, and a fine of not more than $500,000 for
each violation.1"
Similarly, every person who in any capacity participates in an
export knowing that export to be unauthorized under the EAA or
the EAR may be held liable for the export, and is subject to the
imposition of administrative, civil and criminal penalties."' The
administrative penalties include subjecting the offender (and
related persons) to a "denial order," which bars exports by such
persons."2 Civil penalties include a fine of up to $10,000 for each
violation ("except that a civil penalty not to exceed $100,000 may
be imposed for each violation involving national security controls
imposed under section 5 of the EAA"). 3 Criminal penalties

99.

22 C.F.R. § 127.1 (2006). The ITAR also makes it unlawful to use any export or

temporary import control document containing a false statement or misrepresenting (or
omitting) a material fact for the purpose of exporting any defense article, technical data,
or the furnishing of any defense service for which a license or approval is required. See id.
§ 127.2.
100. See id. pt. 127.
101. See id. pt. 764.
102. Id. § 764.3(a)(2).
103. Id. § 764.3(a)(1).
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include, among other things, a fine not more than five times the
value of the export or $50,000, whichever is greater.' " Additionally,
conduct that constitutes a violation of the EAR or the EAA, may
also be prosecuted under other provisions of the law, including
conspiracy,"5 false statements,' ° mail and wire fraud, 7 and money
laundering.'0
Both State and Commerce strongly encourage exporters to
use voluntary disclosures if the exporter believes that it has
violated export control laws.' °9 A voluntary self-disclosure may be
considered a mitigating factor in determining the various penalties
administered by the agency in question."' Recent experience with
BIS, however, suggests that voluntary disclosures may not be in
the exporter's best interest in all situations.
To demonstrate how these penalties may be applied, the
following tables published in United States Export Controls
highlight recent penalties issued by OFAC, BIS, and DDTC:'

104. Id. § 764.3(b). Note that if the EAA or EAR violation is willful, "[the fine shall
be] not more than five times the value of the export or reexport involved or $1,000,000,
whichever is greater; and, in the case of an individual [they] shall be fined not more than
$250,000, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both." Id. § 764.3(b)(2).
105. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006).
106. Id. § 1001.
107. Id. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346.
108. Id. §§ 1956, 1957.
109. HIRSCHHORN, supranote 21, at 94, 174.
110. 15 C.F.R. § 764.5 (2006); 22 C.F.R. § 127.12 (2006); see also Smith, supra note 4, at
625-29 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of voluntary disclosure).
111. See WILLIAM A. ROOT & JOHN R. LIEBMAN, UNITED STATES EXPORT
CONTROLS (4th ed. Supp. 2005).
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CONCLUSION

Compliance with export regulations is an exacting and
demanding discipline, without which an exporter faces shipping
delays, customer dissatisfaction, and expensive enforcement
actions. Properly applied, however, a sound export compliance
program is a competitive asset and once mastered, supports
positive business planning all around.

